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Stated choice experiments are used to investigate the economic valuation of rural residents living in the
province of Quebec for water quality improvements. In Quebec, rural residents played an important role
in the setting of stricter environmental regulations. Unlike most stated choice experiments about the
valuation of improvements in water quality, this study explicitly accounts for risk in the design and
analysis of choice experiments. Risk in phosphorus and coliform reductions is introduced through a
three-point uniform distribution in the choice sets. The results show greater support for constant ab-
solute risk aversion preferences than for constant relative risk aversion. Rural residents value coliform
and phosphorus reductions and the more educated ones are particularly willing to see the government
tax farmers and taxpayers to secure such reductions. As the science improves and risk in water quality
outcomes decrease and as the political weight of non-farm rural residents increase, it should be easier for
governments to replace voluntary cost-share programs by polluter-payer programs.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Agricultural activities have adverse environmental effects that
can be mitigated by the adoption and implementation of Best
Management Practices (BMPs henceforth). Intensive farming can
trigger signiﬁcant releases of pollutants into ditches, streams and
groundwater that impact on water quality at the watershed level.
Studies identiﬁed that excessive phosphorus loads is the major
cause of blooms of blue-green algae in lakes and reservoirs
(Lathrop et al., 1998).1 Blue-green algae blooms are associated
with episodes of toxicity, ﬁsh kills, anoxia, and generally noxiousrue), gale.west@eac.ulaval.ca
o), Lota.tamini@eac.ulaval.ca
cteria which relies on photo-
lue-green algae is not always
epatotoxins which attack the
eview the state of knowledge
s in various areas that need to
trategies in the US.shoreline conditions resulting from wind-blown accumulations of
algae during the summer and as a result, the public's perception of
water quality in lakes is often associated with the frequency of
alga blooms. The Chaudiere region south of Quebec City is one
where water quality is a major concern. Excess phosphorus in this
region and in others has spurred opposition to large scale hog
operations.
In Quebec, a province-wide moratorium on new hog facilities,
including expansion projects, was put in place between 2002 and
2005. This policy did not reduce production in areas with excess
phosphorus, but it gave time to the authorities to develop more
coherent regulations and policies. For example, farmers must pro-
duce a phosphorus report2 to participate in a revenue insurance
program and to get a property tax credit. They are also required to
have a sustainable fertilization plan prepared by an agronomist and
public hearings must be held before new hog production projects2 The report is an inventory of both produced and imported phosphorus loads
and the capacity of soils to handle these loads in compliance with the maximum
annual phosphorus deposits prescribed. More details are available at: http://www.
mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/milieu_agri/agricole/phosphore/bilan-en.htm.
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also promoted the adoption of speciﬁc BMPs like crop rotations,
surface runoff controls, reduced herbicide use, solid and liquid
manure management with adoption rates ranging from 15% to 66%
(Ghazalian et al., 2009). Government programs were under-
performing in meeting sustainable development objectives and
tensions between farmers and rural residents remained in spite of
the additional regulations imposed on farmers (MDDEP, 2011a). A
new approach was needed and in 2013, Quebec's provincial gov-
ernment introduced a new integrated water management program
at the watershed level that provides funding to watershed organi-
zations. The latter bring together representatives of regional county
municipalities (RCM), municipalities, users, environmental groups
and citizens. Watershed organizations are eligible to receive
funding, up to $30,000 CAD/year, to tackle well-documented water
quality problems. A farmer involved in a collective program can
also receive cost-share funds covering 70% of eligible expenses or
90% of eligible expenses if a neighbor farmer whose land borders
his, also applies for cost-share funds.3 It is hoped that farmers and
citizens working together will be able to develop more efﬁcient
interventions (MDDEP, 2011b). Taxpayers contributions toward
BMP adoption is substantial and it is on this issue that this paper
focuses by investigating the preferences of rural residents,
excluding farmers, when it comes to trade-offs involving coliform
and phosphorus reductions and added costs for taxpayers and
farmers.4
Unlike previous stated choice experiments about water quality,
this study explicitly accounts for risk in the design and analysis of
choice experiments. As such, it is hypothesized that support for in-
vestments to improve water quality is conditioned by the expected
improvement inwaterquality, but alsoby thedistributionofpossible
improvements. More speciﬁcally, this study investigates the role of
risk aversion5 on willingness-to-pay estimates for water quality
improvements. The expected utility (EU) theory has a long tradition
in the analysis of decisions under risk. It revolves around the valu-
ation and probability of different outcomes. One of the challenges in
introducing risk aversion is to describe the outcomes and the prob-
abilities in a succinct yet transparent manner (Palsson,1996). This is
accomplished by showing respondents 3-point discrete uniform
distributions with different means and spreads about reductions in
coliforms and phosphorus. Because the lower and upper bounds are
equally distant from themeans and eachproposed reduction has the
same probability, the mean reduction and the spread can be seen as
attributes. Two utility functions incorporating risks are estimated.
The ﬁrst one posits that risk preferences display constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) while the second showcases constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA). Different speciﬁcations are estimated with
ﬁxed and random parameters to assess the robustness of the results
and to address observed and unobserved heterogeneities across
respondents. One set of regressions allows unobserved heteroge-
neity in risk aversionwhile cost coefﬁcients areﬁxed. A second set of
regressions has ﬁxed risk aversion coefﬁcients, but allows for un-
observed heterogeneity in costs.
To summarize, this article aims to analyze the preferences of
non-farm rural residents, about water quality improvements and
how the cost for such improvements should be divided between3 For the details of the program, see http://www.gcaq.ca/client/uploads/179/
68184964294112.pdf.
4 Excess phosphorus is a global problem and increasing on-farm phosphorus
efﬁciency is costly. Sharpley et al. (2015) discuss various policy options to inter-
nalize environmental costs in decisions made by farmers and consumers.
5 Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, p.23) deﬁne a risk averse person as someone who
“prefers a certainty consequence to any risky prospect whose mathematical
expectation of consequences equals that certainty.”farmers and taxpayers. Risk in BMPs capacity to improve water
quality as well as observed and unobserved heterogeneity in risk
attitudes on the part of rural residents are taken into account. The
research relies on stated-choice experiments involving 711
randomly-selected non-farm rural residents from the Chaudiere
region south of Quebec City.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the literature on the adoption of BMPs and growing so-
cial and economic importance of rural residents. Section 3 presents
the research methodology with subsections on expected utility
theory, random utility models and the choice design behind the
stated choice experiments. Section 4 presents the estimation re-
sults and the trade-offs between attributes like willingness to pay
for expected coliform and phosphorus reductions and mean-
standard deviations. Section 5 discusses the policy implications
and limitations of our study.2. The growing inﬂuence of rural residents and BMPs
The literature on BMP adoption focuses on farmers' character-
istics and their farms (e.g., Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012). Tamini
(2011) and Hadrich and Van Winkle (2013) ﬁnd that extension
services increase the probability of BMP adoption. Rahelizatovo
and Gillespie (2004) and Hadrich and Van Winkle (2013)
contend that problem awareness impacts on BMP adoption. Asci
et al. (2015) argue that the incidence of BMPs on the mean and
variance of proﬁt and farmers' attitude toward risk condition
adoption. Ghazalian et al. (2009) ﬁnd that larger farms are more
likely to adopt BMPs because they can more easily afford imple-
mentation costs6 and are more often the object of criticism
regarding the adverse effects of agricultural production. Reimer
et al. (2012) did in-depth interviews with Indiana farmers and
found that those who care about off-farm environmental beneﬁts
and feel responsible to others are most likely to adopt BMPs.
Clearly, most farmers care about how they are perceived by non-
farm rural residents.
The importance of rural residents as a proportion of the rural
population is rising rapidly. In Quebec, the last census reveals that
rural population increased from 1,420,330 in 2001 to 1,534,731 in
2011 with an annual average increase rate of 0.81% while the
number of farms decreased from 32,139 to 29,437 over the same
period (indicating an annual decrease rate of 0.92%).7 A similar
pattern applies for Canada as a whole. This trend has interesting
political economy implications. Farmers must be increasingly sen-
sitive to the preoccupations and expectations of rural residents.
New institutions are being created to reﬂect the growing political
power of rural residents. The aforementioned integrated water
management approach that empowers rural residents in the
decision-making process about environmental initiatives applied at
thewatershed level is clearly a step in this direction. Rural residents
can directly beneﬁt from BMP adoption by farmers8 and that these
beneﬁts are valuable. For example, Luzar and Cosse (1998) ﬁnd that
having a private well tends to increase the willingness to pay for
one's own and state-level water quality.6 Ghazalian et al. (2010) and Tamini et al. (2012) ﬁnd that BMPs tend to slightly
increase costs/decrease proﬁt, but Valentin et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the adoption of
nutrient BMPs has a positive effect on net farm income. Hadrich and Van Winkle
(2013) ﬁnd that farms with low debt loads are more likely to adopt BMPs.
7 For rural population statistics, see http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/
sum-som/l01/cst01/demo62f-eng.htm and for the number of farms see http://
www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/stats/census/number.htm.
8 Rural residents may also adopt BMPs for homeowners, a subject investigated by
Brehm et al. (2013).
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The aim of this study is to investigate rural residents' prefer-
ences about coliform and phosphorus in water stemming from the
implementation of BMPs. One of our objectives is to ascertain
whether dispersion around predicted reductions impacts on the
valuation of coliform and phosphorus reductions by rural residents
and if so, to measure the risk aversion of rural residents. Another
objective is to evaluate the extent by which rural residents are
willing to have farmers and taxpayers contribute ﬁnancially to
achieve coliform and phosphorus reductions. Our analysis relies on
stated choice experiments which are most useful to estimate the
value of goods and services in the absence of market data. The idea
is to present choice sets to respondents and to extract information
about their preferences from the choices they make. Our intro-
duction of risk in stated choice experiments is grounded in ex-
pected utility theory (EUT). The next subsection describes the
concept and two common types of risk preferences.10 When g ¼ 1 , UðrÞ ¼ logðrÞ, RRA ¼ 1.3.1. The valuation of pollution reductions under risk
EUT has a long tradition in applied economics to analyze
behavior in the presence of risk. It assumes that respondents know
the probabilities and beneﬁts associated with each possible
outcome and simply sums up the expected beneﬁts when evalu-
ating a given scenario. Respondents were confronted to three
equally probable contingent reductions in phosphorus (p) and in
coliforms (c): rk  dk; rk; rk þ dk with k ¼ p, c; rk is the mean
reduction and dk is the discrete interval and the spread is then 2dk.
All else equal, risk averse respondents prefer less to more disper-
sion. Utility functions allowing for risk aversion must be speciﬁed
and their non-linearity adds complexity (Glenk and Colombo, 2013;
Palsson, 1996). Two popular forms of risk aversion are considered.
Constant absolute risk aversion behavior is characterized by the
utility function ðUÞ: U ¼ 1 egr , with ARA≡v2U=vr2vU=vr ¼ g,
RRA≡v
2U=vr2
vU=vr r ¼ gr, where ARA and RRA are respectively the
Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcients of absolute and relative risk aversion.
CARA implies that risk aversion is constant, regardless of the size of
the pollution reductions considered. With three equal probabilities,
expected utility can be expressed as:
EU ¼

3 eðdpþrpÞgp

1þ edpgp þ e2dpgp

3
þ

3 eðdcþrcÞgc

1þ edcgc þ e2dcgc

3
þ
XJ
j¼1
bjxj (1)
Variables xj are ﬁxed and include monetary variables like cost
and other attributes. As speciﬁed, attitude toward risk can differ
whether risk is about phosphorus or coliform reductions. When
allowed to be random, a cost parameter bcos t can be replaced by
-ebcos t to insure that the effect of cost on utility is strictly negative.
Risk preferences that exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
also exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). This means
that dispersion induces less disutility around large expected
pollutant reductions than around small ones. The corresponding
utility function is: UðrÞ ¼ r1g1g; g2ð0;19,ARA ¼ gr , RRA ¼ g. When
g ¼ 0, U ¼ r and agents are risk neutral while when g>0, agents9 In practice, the estimate of g may not fall within the 0e1 bounds. A logistic
transformation can be used to insure that the estimate falls within the bounds or
else inequality restrictions can be imposed in a Bayesian framework.are risk averse.10 Expected utility can be depicted by11:
EU ¼ r
1gp
p þ
 dp þ rp1gp þ dp þ rp1gp
3

1 gp

þ r
1gc
c þ ð  dc þ rcÞ1gc þ ðdc þ rcÞ1gc
3ð1 gcÞ
þ
XJ
j¼1
bjxj (2)
Rural residents may be risk averse at different degrees and a
parsimonious way to accommodate this heterogeneity is to rely on
a random parameter logit (RPL). The RPL estimator is brieﬂy dis-
cussed in the next subsection.3.2. Preference heterogeneity in empirical models
Random utility models (RUMs) have been used extensively to
characterize the preferences of respondents from the choices they
make in stated choice experiments. Under RUM, respondents can
assess the value of different attributes and hence choose alterna-
tives that provide them the highest level of utility. From the esti-
mated coefﬁcients of utility functions, willingness-to-pay (WTP)
estimates can be generated, but their usefulness could be impaired
if heterogeneity in preferences is not properly accounted for
(Campbell et al., 2013). The RPL assumes a continuous distribution
for a subset of parameters in dealing with heterogeneity across
respondents. McFadden and Train (2000) demonstrate that any
random utility model can be approximated by a mixed logit with
the appropriate choice of variables and mixing distribution. The
formulation of the RPL model decomposes utility into an unob-
served, preference heterogeneity component and a deterministic
component. In each choice set t, respondent i chooses the alter-
native that yields the highest utility amongst the j alternatives. The
respondent chooses the alternative thatmaximizes his or her utility
in each choice occasion. The random utility of respondent i is
deﬁned as: Uijt ¼ bXijt þ hiXijt þ εijt where Xijt is a vector of
observed alternative-speciﬁc attributes including the mean and the
standard deviation of phosphorus and coliform reductions, b is the
vector of coefﬁcients associated with these attributes, and hi is a
vector of k standard deviation parameters. εijt is a stochastic term
that is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed
extreme value (Gumbel distributed). Under this speciﬁcation each
respondent has his or her own vector of parameters, bi, which
deviates from the population mean, b, by the vector hi. Assuming
that the unconditional density f ðbjwÞ has a continuous distribution,
the unconditional probability of the observed sequence of choices
is PriðwÞ ¼
R YT
t¼1
YJ
j¼1
(
expðbxijtÞPJ
k¼1expðbxiktÞ
)dijt
f ðbjwÞ. This probability
deﬁnes a mixed logit model with continuous mixing distributions
and the related log-likelihood function is ﬁtted with simulation
methods. Conditional on how the b coefﬁcients are distributed over
the population, Train (2003) shows that the simulated probability is
an unbiased estimator of Pri and that its variance decreases as the
number of draws used to simulate the probability increases.12
Heterogeneity amongst respondents can also be conditioned by
observable variables such as socio-demographic variables and11 When there are only two contingencies, r and 0, with probabilities p and 1-p, as
in Glenk and Colombo (2013), the EU isoelastic speciﬁcation reduces to: EU ¼ p rg1g.
12 Hanley et al. (2006) contend that marginal utilities of environmental attributes
are likely to be correlated and that it is best when possible to allow for random
coefﬁcients to be correlated.
Fig. 1. Sample choice set.
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rameters are distributed according to a multivariate normal dis-
tribution to allow for correlation between random parameters.
Some coefﬁcients are usually assumed ﬁxed to facilitate conver-
gence and the interpretation of welfare measures (Colombo et al.,
2009; Hensher et al., 2005).
3.3. Study design and data
When it comes to agri-environmental policies and more spe-
ciﬁcally to BMPs, questions arise about who should pay, who should
implement BMPs, and which BMPs should be implemented. There
have been many studies investigating taxpayers' willingness to pay
(WTP) for improvements in water quality (e.g., Kosenius, 2010).
WTP for water quality tends to be higher for people living close to
polluted water. This is why our sample consists of non-farm rural
residents. Furthermore, our study design allows for water quality
improvements to be funded by taxpayers and/or farmers as rural
residents might favor the pay-the polluter or the polluter-payer
principles. The farmers' contribution is expressed in $/acre CAD,
but in the instructions to respondents, it has been mentioned that a
$10/acre meant a contribution of $3000 for a 300-acre farm which
is roughly the average acreage in Quebec.13 Secondly, as stated
above, we bring risk in the delivery of water quality improvements
which take the form of percentage reductions in phosphorus and
coliform.14 These elements were incorporated into the design of the
stated preference survey which beneﬁtted from comments and
suggestions from extension agents, farmers and rural residents
who met with us and participated in a pretest experiment.
The ﬁnal design of the study comprised of 12 choice sets, which
were blocked into two small designs, such that each respondent
was required to complete a panel of six choice sets.15 The choice set
design was developed with NGene (NGene, 2012). As shown by
Colombo et al. (2016) in choice experiment, inconsistencies choice
has a great impact on the welfare measures. In that respect, a D-
efﬁcient design was used to optimize on the precision of the pa-
rameters to be estimated.16 For each choice set, respondents were
asked to choose between two experimentally designed alternatives
and a status quo alternative. When making their choices, re-
spondents were asked to consider only the information presented
in the choice set and to treat each set separately. Fig. 1 shows an
example of a choice set. It is seemingly made up of four attributes,
namely phosphorus reductions, coliform reductions, taxpayers'
cost and farmers' cost, but there are actually six attributes because
three equally probable reductions are proposed instead of a
deterministic one when describing reductions in phosphorus and13 Taxpayers' costs are expressed in dollars per taxpayer, but in our instructions to
respondents it was stated that a $2 contribution would amount to a $12 million
investment in water quality.
14 Percentage reductions have been used as public policy targets by the Quebec
and Vermont governments and they have also been used to describe BMP perfor-
mance by hydrologists (Michaud et al., 2007). Percentages were used to portray
water quality improvements because they are easy to understand by respondents
who had to evaluate several attribute trade-offs embodied in the choice sets. The
percentages in the choice sets were based on documented BMP effects in Quebec.
For example, Meals et al. (2010) report that reduced fertilizer rates brought down P
concentrations from 394 kg P hae1 to 270, 281, and 294 kg P hae1, or reductions of
25e30%, while Michaud et al. (2007, p.339) argue that “the adoption of conserva-
tion tillage on all HRUs cropped to corn or soybean, combined with intercropping of
leguminous forages and small grains within the watershed, would result in a 35%
predicted drop in P loads from the watershed's cropped lands”.
15 This is a standard technique used to reduce the number of choices (Louviere
et al., 2000, p. 83e137).
16 Rose et al. (2008) report statistical evidence indicating that D-efﬁcient designs
outperform traditional orthogonal designs in estimating the utility parameters in
stated choice experiments. The D-error for our design was 0.001435.in coliform. The 3-point discrete uniform distribution conveys, in a
most transparent fashion, information about the dispersion around
the expected reduction (since the standard deviation is a monotone
transformation of the spread or the difference between the
maximum and minimum reductions) without having to explain
concepts of dispersion to respondents (Table 1). The level of edu-
cation is a categorical order variable ranging from 1 to 5. The score
of one indicates ‘primary level’ where the score of 5 is associated
with ‘post-graduate level’.17
The sample was made up of rural residents in the province of
Quebec. The survey instrument was pretested with 50 respondents
to insure that questions were phrased properly, that the stated
choice experiments were correctly speciﬁed18 and that the overall
length of the exercise was reasonable. Participants were also given
pecuniary incentives to complete the survey. Data were collected
from 976 rural residents, but after deleting incomplete surveys and
observations that are considered as highly inconsistent in order to
reduce the effect of inconsistence choices of the WTP, the total
number of respondents dropped to 711, yielding to 4266 completed
choice sets and 12,798 observations in the panel. Response consis-
tency is assessed by a number of questions, which allowed identi-
ﬁcation of individuals, who always chose the expensive alternative
or the status quo in all experiments. The survey was conducted
during the spring of 2012 via internet by a specialized ﬁrm.
4. Results and discussions
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample. Approxi-
mately 56% of the respondents werewomen. The average age in the
group was 48 years old and two thirds was between 40 and 70
years old. A large proportion of the respondents (72%) had post-
high school education. In all, 13% of the respondents had an
annual personal income of less than $25,000, a percentage of 72%
had an annual income between $25,000 and $100,000 and 15%
earned at least $100,000. In terms of gender, age and income, the
sample is quite similar to the population of rural residents in the
province of Quebecwhich is characterized by a 60e40women-men
ratio, an average age of 48, and a proportion of persons with an
annually personal income less than $25,000 of 15% (Statistics
Canada, 2011).17 Estimations with educational dummy variables were compared to estimations
with a single education variable. Education effects were monotone and similar
across speciﬁcations and the more parsimonious speciﬁcation was retained for the
computations of marginal effects.
18 The layout should be clear and the choice set design and parameters should be
such as to produce tradeoffs, reduce the likelihood of dominant alternatives, and
enable us to accurately estimate preference parameters to compute WTP estimates.
Table 1
Attributes and their levels.
Attributes Variable name Units Levels
Expected phosphorus reduction P (%) 0, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40
Expected coliform reduction C (%) 0, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40
Half spread around expected phosphorus reduction STD_P (%) 0, 5, 10, 15, 20
Half spread around expected coliform reduction STD_C (%) 0, 5, 10, 15, 20
Farmers' costa F ($ CAD/acre) 5, 0, 10, 25, 35
Taxpayers' cost T ($ CAD/year) 0, 2, 10, 18
a The negative value (5) of Farmers' cost means farmers will earn a proﬁt of $5 CAD per acre.
Table 2
Sample summary statistics.
Variable Units Mean Std. Dev.
Expected Phosphorus
reduction (P)
% 30.745 9.979
Expected Coliform
reduction (C)
% 24.254 9.979
Half spread around mean
Phosphorus reduction
% 9.979 7.811
Half spread around mean
Coliform reduction
% 6.666 5.774
Std. dev. around mean
Phosphorus reduction
(STD_P)
% 5.951 4.631
Std. dev. around mean
Coliform reduction
(STD_C)
% 4.036 3.444
Farmers' Cost (F) $ CAD/acre 3.059 7.484
Taxpayers' Cost (T) $ CAD/acre 10.596 7.983
Age Year 48.327 14.361
Formal education (edu)a e 3.111 0.987
% Primary school ¼ 1 4.08%
% Secondary school ¼ 2 23.49%
% High school ¼ 3 37.69%
% University ¼ 4 26.72%
% Post graduate ¼ 5 8.02%
# of respondents (711) * # of choice sets (6) * # of alternatives (3) ¼ 12,798
observations.
a Mean of education.
B. Larue et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 197 (2017) 296e304300The ﬁrst part of the questionnaire had attitude questions about
environmental issues more generally and water quality more spe-
ciﬁcally. The mean score for perceived media exaggeration of
environmental problems is closer to 0 than to 6 at 2.02, but the
standard deviation is particularly large at 1.82 (Table 2). The mean
score for the self-assessed degree of environmental concern is quite
high at 3.70, but it has also a fairly large standard deviation. From
these statistics, one can anticipate that observed and unobserved
heterogeneities will play important roles in the analysis of the
stated choice experiments.19 The range deﬁned by gc þ gc;educ*educ±1:96*STD gc spans negative values
which should be censored at zero to insure that the expected utility is not
decreasing in mean coliform reductions. Replacing gc by e
gc is a way to avoid
negative values, but attempts to impose this restriction failed. However, expo-
nential transformations were successfully used to insure that random cost effects
are strictly negative.4.1. Estimation results
Models grounded in EUT are nonlinear and have been estimated
with NLogit 5's nonlinear random parameter logit estimator. Two
types of risk preferences are considered. Given the nonlinearity of
the expected utility functions, model speciﬁcations were kept
simple and a single interaction variable, education, was included
because it was signiﬁcant in all models. The ﬁrst type of models
posits that respondents have constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA). Three different empirical versions of Eq. (1) were then
estimated and the results were presented in the ﬁrst three columns
of Table 3. Results in the ﬁrst column pertain to a speciﬁcation with
random risk preference parameters interacting with education. In
the case of coliforms, the Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcient of absolute risk
aversion (ARA) is bgc≡gc þ gc;educ*educ. The coefﬁcient gc isnormally distributed with a mean of 0.08, that is not statistically
different from zero, but the coefﬁcient gc;educ ¼ 0:06 is highly sig-
niﬁcant. This implies that rural residents are risk averse when it
comes to possible deviations around expected coliform reductions
and that absolute risk aversion is increasing with education. The
standard deviation of coliforms STD gc ¼ 0:28 is highly signiﬁcant
and its size conﬁrms that there is much unobserved heterogeneity
in the degree of risk aversion across rural residents.19 As for
phosphorus, the coefﬁcient gp;educ is positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant, gp is not statistically signiﬁcant, but STD gp is. Thus for
both coliform and phosphorus, risk aversion is increasing with the
level of education and unobserved heterogeneity matters in the
conditioning of risk preferences. Having taxpayers and farmers pay
to achieve water quality improvements, all else equal, signiﬁcantly
decreases utility of respondents as bcos t;t and bcos t;f are negative
and highly signiﬁcant. Themagnitude of these cost coefﬁcients play
an important role in the analysis of the tradeoffs between costs and
expected reductions in coliforms and phosphorus discussed in the
subsection on willingness-to-pay estimates.
The results appearing in the second column are from a model
that posits that mean risk aversion is the same whether risk per-
tains to coliform or phosphorus reductions. The parameters that do
not pertain to mean risk aversion are robust to the constraint as
they are very close to the ones reported in the ﬁrst column, but a
likelihood ratio test 2(-3896 þ 3903) ¼ 14 > c23;0:05 ¼ 7:82 implies
the rejection of the restricted model (i.e., H0 : gc ¼ gp;
gc;educ ¼ gp;educ; STDgc ¼ STDgp ).
The third CARA model assumes that all residents have the same
risk parameters. The mean risk-aversion parameters are non-
random and do not interact with education. The risk aversion pa-
rameters differ signiﬁcantly gc ¼ 0:24>0:05 ¼ gp which suggests
that rural residents are more risk aversewhen risk is about coliform
reductions than when phosphorus reductions are considered. This
might reﬂect a greater concern for health risks than for environ-
mental ones. The third CARA model has random cost coefﬁcients
allowed to interact with education. An exponential transformation
was performed to insure that costs have strictly negative effects on
utility. The rationale for random costs is that different individuals
might have different views about who should pay for water quality
improvements. As expected, themean cost coefﬁcients are negative
and signiﬁcant. The costs-education interaction effect is signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero for taxpayers' costs and this implies that
more highly educated residents are less inconvenienced by having
taxpayers and farmers coerced into ﬁnancially contributing to
water quality improvements. This third CARA model has the same
Table 3
Expected utility CARA and CRRA models.
Coefﬁcients CARA(1) CARA(2) CARA(3) CRRA(4) CRRA(5) CRRA(6)
gc 0.0837 (0.0972) 0.0095 (0.0592) 0.2420*** (0.0688) 0.0220 (0.0738) 0.3542*** (0.0373) 0.3570*** (0.0366)
gc;educ 0.0610* (0.0335) 0.0752*** (0.0219) e 0.1177*** (0.0176) e e
STD gc 0.2851*** (0.0587) 0.2836*** (0.0408) e e e e
gp 0.1055 (0.1176) 0.0095 (0.0592) 0.0513* (0.0290) 0.4713*** (0.1006) 0.4825*** (0.0589) 0.4813*** (0.0582)
gp;educ 0.0757*** (0.0218) 0.0752*** (0.0219) e 0.0239 (0.0210) e e
STD gp 0.2380*** (0.0695) 0.2836*** (0.0408) e 0.1414*** (0.0519) e e
bcos t;t 0.2055*** (0.0413) 0.2137*** (0.0409) 1.0904* (0.6387) 0.3423*** (0.0433) 0.6677*** (0.1137) 0.7035*** (0.0982
bcos t;t;educ e e 0.6426** (0.2637) e 0.1146*** (0.0360) 0.1251*** (0.0307)
STDbcos t;t e e 1.7203*** (0.3037) 0.1489*** (0.0211) 0.2890*** (0.0801) 0.1884** (0.0935)
bcos t;f 0.1578*** (0.0203) 0.1580*** (0.0203) 1.7565*** (0.4178) e 0.2222*** (0.0645) 0.1414*** (0.0214)
bcos t;f ;educ e e 0.17395 (0.12857) e 0.0284 (0.0195) e
STDbcos t;f e e 0.76977*** (0.18113) e 0.20191*** (0.04269) e
Constant 1.8626*** (0.1477) 1.7203*** (0.1553) 1.27840*** (0.13319) 4.4567*** (0.1670) 4.0634*** (0.1733) 4.1238*** (0.1663)
LLF 3896 3903 4025 4504 4521 4536
McFadden R2 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.03
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. STD is the standard deviation estimate associated with the RPL's random parameters. c denotes coliform and p phosphorus. CARA
denotes constant absolute risk aversion while CRRA stands for constant relative risk aversion. cost,f represents farmers' cost while cost,t stands for taxpayers' cost.
***, **, * ¼ Signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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well.
The last three columns in Table 3 feature estimation results for
CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) models. All three models
have signiﬁcant constant relative aversion CRA coefﬁcients. The
fourth column features a model with a random risk coefﬁcient for
phosphorus ðgpÞ and a ﬁxed risk coefﬁcient for coliforms ðgcÞ. This
speciﬁcation came about after experimenting with more general
speciﬁcations. The CRA coefﬁcient for phosphorus varies between
0.19 and 0.75 because of unobserved heterogeneity (i.e.,bgp ¼ 0:47±1:96*0:14), but it does not vary with education. In
contrast, the non-random CRA coefﬁcient for coliforms varies be-
tween 0.12 and 0.48 depending on the level of education (i.e.,bgc ¼ 0:12*educ). The cost parameters are statistically signiﬁcant
and have the right sign. The ﬁt is actually slightly better than the ﬁt
of the model in the ﬁfth column which has two random cost pa-
rameters but non-random risk aversion parameters. This suggests
that heterogeneity in risk aversion is more important that hetero-
geneity in costs. The sixth and last column has amodel with a single
random cost parameter. Clearly, this last model is misspeciﬁed, but
the risk and mean cost coefﬁcients are very close to their coun-
terparts in the ﬁfth column and this attests of the robustness of the
results. Amongst CRRA models, the one with a random risk coef-
ﬁcient ﬁts the data best, but its log likelihood is not as high as that
of CARA models. It can be concluded that empirical support is
stronger for CARA risk preferences than for CRRA risk preferences
amongst expected utility models.4.2. Willingness to (have taxpayers or farmers) pay for expected
reductions in coliforms and phosphorus
Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) estimates are typically computed as
the negative of the ratio of the coefﬁcient for an attribute of interest
and the coefﬁcient of a monetary variable when the utility function
is linear in the parameters. With the CARA expected utility function
depicted in Eq. (1), WTP can be derived in a similar manner:
WTPrkcn ¼ 
egkðrkþdkÞ

1þ egkdk þ e2gkdk

gk
3bcos t;n
; k ¼ p; c; n ¼ t; f
(3)
WTP estimates can be computed at speciﬁc mean reduction (rk)and deviation (dk) for phosphorus and coliforms and with respect
to cost for taxpayers (n ¼ t) or farmers (n ¼ f). WTP in (3) depends
on only two estimated coefﬁcients (bcos t;n;gk) in the absence of
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In models with education
interacting with costs (i.e., CARA (3) and CRRA (6)), WTP increases
(decreases) with education if the interaction coefﬁcient is positive
(negative). When the risk parameter is allowed to have a direct
effect and an interaction effect with education, parameter gk must
be replaced with gk þ gk;educ*education to handle observed het-
erogeneity. WTP is increasing in the level of absolute risk aversion
and in the size of the deviations dk around the expected mean
reductions.
When respondents are assumed to behave according to CRRA
risk preferences, their WTP based on Eq. (2) is:
WTPrkcn ¼ 
rgkk þ ðrk  dkÞ
gk þ ðrk þ dkÞgk
3bcos t;n
; k ¼ p; c; n ¼ t; f
(4)
Parameters treated as random are also interacting with educa-
tion and this is implicit in the deﬁnitions of gk and bcos t;n. WTP
estimates are computed by replacing random parameters in the
WTP formulas by 10,000 draws from the distributions of the
random parameters. The resulting empirical distributions can then
be used to generate measures of central tendency and dispersion
for WTPs.
TheWTPsmeasure the ﬁnancial burdens that rural residents are
willing to impose on themselves and other taxpayers and farmers
to secure water quality improvements. Who should pay for water
quality improvements is the sort of question that elicited different
viewpoints when the pre-test for this study was conducted. Some
view agriculture as a major cause of water quality degradation and
would like the polluter-payer principle enforced. However, Ellison
et al. (2010) found that US taxpayers generally support farm sub-
sidies, especially for small farms, evenwhen they believe that these
farm families enjoy a higher income than their own household.
Their support for farm subsidies is rooted in concerns over food
security. In the survey, some non-farm resident respondents indi-
cated that farmers had to ﬁnancially contribute more to improve
the environment, but 70% of the sample believes that food prices
would be higher if farm subsidies were reduced.
The impliedWTP results in terms of taxpayers' cost and farmers'
cost are computed for different models and are summarized in
Table 4
Willingness to have taxpayers or farmers pay ($ CAD) for coliform and phosphorus
reductions.
CARA(1) CARA(2) CARA(3) CRRA(4)
WTPc,t 0.68 [0e1.26] 0.78 [0e1.28] 6.86 [0.76e60.61] 3.36 -
WTPp,t 0.48 [0e1.12] 0.78 [0e1.17] 1.90 [0.21e16.78] 3.62 [3.34e3.94]
WTPc,f 0.92 [0e1.69] 1.05 [0e1.73] 0.85 [0.32e2.30] 7.73 -
WTPp,f 0.65 [0e1.51] 1.05 [0e1.73] 0.23 [0.09e0.63] 8.32 [7.69e9.06]
The median is the ﬁrst entry. Ranges for WTPs are in brackets. The lower bound is
max.[0, 0.1 quantile] while the upper bound in the 0.9 quantile. Education was set at
3 (its mean value), and rk; sk were set at 1.5 and 1, respectively. 10,000 sets of pa-
rameters were drawn from the distributions of random parameters to compute the
simulated WTPs.
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robust measure of central tendency. It is less inﬂuenced by outliers
and it can be related to a majority voting rule (Bateman et al., 2002
p. 194). The ﬁrst column of WTP estimates is associated with the
CARA (1) model. The second column shows WTPs from the CARA
(2) model which assumes that risk aversion parameters for co-
liforms and phosphorus are identical. Therefore, the numerator in
(3) is the same for coliforms and phosphorus and it incorporates a
random parameter. Because marginal utility from coliform and
phosphorus reductions must be weakly positive, the interval was
trimmed on the left side to insure that the lower bound does not fall
below zero.20 However, such transformations induce very long tails
that inﬂate the upper bound as can be shown in theWTP results for
CARA (3) whose costs parameters were replaced by exponential
transformations in the estimation.
According to the preferred CARA (1) model with random risk
aversion parameters, the median rural residents would be willing
to impose a ﬁnancial burden of $0.68 CAD on each taxpayer in order
to secure a 10% reduction in coliforms. To put things in perspective,
the contribution of Quebec taxpayers would be able to fund $20.4
million CAD program for a 50% drop that would see the coliform
count fall from 300 to 150 organisms (i.e., from “ﬁshable water” to
“swimmable water”). The corresponding WTP estimate from the
CARA (2) model is quite similar, but the ones from the CARA (3) and
CRRA (4) are much higher withmedian respondents willing to have
each Quebec taxpayer pay $6.86 CAD and $3.36 CAD for a 10%
reduction in coliforms. Phosphorus reductions are not as valuable
as coliform reductions, except under the CRRA (4) model. Median
WTP estimates range from $0.48 CAD to $3.62 CAD for a 10%
reduction in phosphorus concentration. The relatively highWTP for
phosphorus reductions suggest that rural residents derive direct
beneﬁts from such reductions. Yao et al. (2014) found that people
living within an area where investment would be made to preserve
biodiversity have higher WTP than people living outside the area.
The high WTP may also reﬂect concerns for farmers whose
participation in the main income-support program in Quebec re-
quires phosphorus monitoring.
The median resident in the CARA (1) model is willing to impose
on farmers a cost of $0.92 CAD per acre for a 10% reduction in the
coliform and $0.65 CAD per acre for an equally large reduction in
phosphorus. The WTPs under the CARA (2) and CARA (3) models
are quite similar for coliforms ($1.05 CAD and $0.85 CAD), but there
are larger differences across models for phosphorus even if one
discards the CRRA (4) estimate as unreasonably high. The CARA
WTP estimates range from $0.23 CAD to $1.05 CAD. To put things in
perspective, Gitau et al. (2004) estimated the lowest possible cost
to implement a 60% reduction in phosphorus on a typical New York20 Attempts to estimate the model with exponential transformations of risk pa-
rameters did not succeed.farm at around $3 CAD per acre.21 TheWTP estimate from the CARA
(1) model for a 60% phosphorus reduction indicate that the middle
rural resident would let farmers pay the whole cost and then some
($0.65*6 ¼ $3.30 CAD). However, the lower WTP from the CARA (3)
model suggests that the middle rural resident would want farmers
to pay only part of the full cost to achieve a 60% phosphorus
reduction. Since the CARA (1) model ﬁts the data better than CARA
(3), it can be inferred that at least half of the rural residents in our
sample would want to see farmers pay the full cost of BMPs.
Nevertheless, WTP estimates varymuch across respondents as they
reﬂect variations in objective and subjective concerns and values
across residents.
The pay-the-polluter principle has been criticized for its inef-
fectiveness in solving the “phosphorus puzzle” by Garnache et al.
(2016) who advocate a swing toward the polluter-payer principle.
The above results show that non-farm rural residents support
government subsidies provided that phosphorus and coliform re-
ductions be actually achieved. This is in line with the results of
Gitau et al. (2004). As in Polyzou et al. (2011), rural residents
endowed with higher social capital are willing to see higher con-
tributions from taxpayers. However, they also favor increasing the
ﬁnancial burden of farmers to secure water quality improvements.
This provides more scope for departing from voluntary cost-share
programs currently in fashion. Governments in industrialized
countries subsidize agriculture and are hesitant to consider taxes
and costly regulations to internalize negative externalities associ-
ated with agricultural production. This is likely to change as the
weight of non-farm rural residents increase relative to that of
farmers.
5. Concluding remarks
Excess phosphorus in the Chaudiere region south of Quebec City
in Canada has spurred opposition toward large scale hog opera-
tions, bringing together environmental groups, local businesses
and residents in demanding stricter environmental regulations to
reduce health and environmental hazards and adverse effects on
tourism and recreation. As the number of farmers is shrinking,
policy makers are increasingly attentive to the needs of other rural
residents and this is why the aim of study is to investigate the
valuation of water quality improvements in the form of phosphorus
and coliform reductions by non-farm rural residents. One of the
objectives of this study is to assess the extent by which dispersion
around expected pollution reductions might impact on the value of
expected reductions. A second objective is to characterize the na-
ture and degree of risk aversion amongst rural residents when it
comes to water quality. A third objective has to do with the esti-
mation of the ﬁnancial contributions of farmers and taxpayers to
secure water quality improvements.
Choice experiments were used to gather information about the
preferences of rural residents which were analyzed with random
utility models allowing for risk. Even though conﬁdence intervals
around environmental outcomes, including BMP performance, can
be wide, few studies have explicitly accounted for risk. Random
utility models featuring either constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) were estimated
and heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion amongst residents
was dealt with by having interaction effects and random parame-
ters. A stated preference design made up of 12 choice sets blocked
into two small designs was developed to have each respondent21 The cost was US$1700 for a 300 ha/744 acre farm. Using a farm input price
index (cansim table 328-0015) and an exchange rate of 0.78 gave us an estimate in
2016 Canadian dollars.
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spondents would take the time to properly evaluate the trade-offs
between expected pollution reductions, deviations around mean
reductions and costs imposed on taxpayers and farmers. Dispersion
was directly incorporated into the choice sets through a three-point
uniform distribution describing the expected reductions as well as
deviations from the mean. The paper focused on coliforms and
phosphorus reductions because many rural residents have their
well water tested for coliforms on a regular basis and becausemuch
of the provincial government's changes in agricultural and envi-
ronmental policies and regulations have focused on phosphorus.
The estimations indicate that CARA models perform better than
CRRA models. As expected, the degree of risk aversion amongst
rural residents is increasing with education and varies in relation to
unobservable factors. Risk aversion implies that expected re-
ductions in pollutants are valued less in the presence of dispersion
around expected reductions. As in Polyzou et al. (2011), rural resi-
dents endowed with higher social capital are willing to see the
government use higher taxes to secure water quality improve-
ments. They are also willing to see the government ask more from
farmers. Voluntary cost-share programs in Quebec and elsewhere
have been ineffective and Garnache et al. (2016) argue for a change
in paradigm. In Quebec as in most of the industrialized world, it has
been difﬁcult to reduce agricultural subsidies and farm programs
because of public support. However, our results suggest that more
can be asked from farmers when it comes to securing water quality
improvements. Interestingly, the odds of a switch to a polluter-
payer paradigm are likely to improve over time because the polit-
ical weight of non-farm rural residents is on the rise. Also, the risk
of investing in underperforming practices and technologies should
be reduced as the science around water quality improves.
For future research, it would be useful to focus on the prefer-
ences of city residents to determine whether distance impacts on
willingness-to-pay for water quality in rural areas.22 While task
complexity is always a concern in stated choice experiments, it
might be interesting to depart from the uniform distribution and
allow different water quality outcomes to have different probabil-
ities. Different types of behavior under risk could then be tested for.
Finally, results from stated choice experiments are subject to the
so-called hypothetical bias (i.e., what people say and what they do
may differ). There is a rapidly growing literature on how cheap talk,
honesty priming and other mitigating strategies can be used to get
more reliable results (e.g., Bello and Abdulai, 2016; Whitehead
et al., 2016). While precautions were taken to minimize the hypo-
thetical bias, our results remain subject to the usual caveat.
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